1L Civil Procedure Outline
School: Duke University School of Law
Instructor: Professor Thomas B. Metzloff
Semester: Fall 2017
Textbook: Civil
... [Show More] Procedure: A Contemporary Approach (4th ed.) by A. Benjamin Spencer
I) Punitive Damages
A) State Punitive Damages / Constitutional Excessiveness
i) There is no mathematical bright line for punitive damages. Pacific Mutual v. Haslip.
ii) BMW v. Gore guideposts for determining excessiveness:
(a) Degree of reprehensibility of ∆’s conduct
(1) Degree of reprehensibility of ∆’s conduct is the most important indicium of
reasonableness of a punitive damages award. State Farm v. Campbell (quoting
Gore).
(2) State Farm factors for assessing degree of reprehensibility:
(a) whether the harm was physical as opposed to economic;
(b) whether the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless
disregard of the health and safety of others;
(c) whether the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability;
(d) whether the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident;
and
(e) whether the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit,
or mere accident.
(3) π is presumptively made whole by compensatory damages, thus punitive
damages should only be awarded if ∆’s culpability is so reprehensible as to
warrant the imposition of further sanctions to achieve punishment or
deterrence.
(4) Gore: minimal because damages were purely economic; BMW did not act in
bad faith
(5) State Farm: while ∆’s conduct was bad (albeit in the economic realm),
assessment of reprehensibility of ∆’s conduct should be limited to the
particular case, not used to punish it for similar but unrelated nationwide
conduct.
(b) Ratio (of punitive damages to compensatory damages)
(1) There are no hard, constitutional limits on the ratio, but “few awards
exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to
a significant degree, will satisfy due process.” State Farm.
(2) Ratios greater than those previously upheld by the Court may only comport
with due process where “a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a
small amount of economic damages.” State Farm.
(3) Conversely, when compensatory damages are substantial, a lesser ratio (of
perhaps 1:1) can reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee. State
Farm.
(4) Gore: 500:1 ratio raises “suspicious judicial eyebrow”
(5) State Farm: there is “a presumption against” a 145:1 ratio
(c) Sanctions for comparable misconduct
1
(1) The existence of a criminal penalty does bear on the seriousness with which a
State views the wrongful action. State Farm.
(2) But the civil process is not meant to be used to assess criminal penalties,
which require heightened standards of proof. State Farm.
(3) Gore: Maximum civil/criminal penalties would be much less.
(4) State Farm: The greatest sanction would be a $10,000 fine for fraud, dwarfed
by the $145 million award.
iii) Scalia’s Dissent: Due Process provides no substantive protections against “excessive”
or “unreasonable” awards of punitive damages (punitive damages have long been
accepted) and the punitive damages jurisprudence arising from BMW v. Gore is
insusceptible of principled application.
B) Federal Punitive Damages (More Than Due Process)
i) Exxon v. Baker: Federal maritime punitive damages are capped at 1:1 ratio
(a) Punitive damages are very rare internationally
(b) Punitive damages are also limited nationally, with a few outliers.
(1) Variability of the award is a major issue.
II) Jurisdiction
A) For a court to hear a case, it must have personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject
matter jurisdiction over the controversy. It must also be a statutorily appropriate venue.
B) Personal Jurisdiction
i) Rationale for Personal Jurisdiction – World-Wide Volkswagen
(a) Protects ∆s from the burden of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum (Due
process/fairness concern)
(1) This may be reduced over time due to developments in transportation and
communications – McGee
(b) Ensures States do not reach beyond limits imposed on them by their status as
coequal sovereigns (interstate federalism concern). But really, it’s an individual
liberty interest of which sovereignty is a component, as it can be waived by the ∆.
(c) Other Jurisdictional Interests:
(1) Each party wants a convenient, fair, and unbiased forum to resolve disputes.
(2) States want to open up their courts, resolve disputes, and protect their citizens.
(3) States want to enforce their substantive laws and policies.
ii) Historical Origins
(a) Personal jurisdiction originated in Pennoyer v. Neff in three types:
(1) In Personam Jurisdiction: jurisdiction over a person or entity; gained by:
(a) Consent: ∆ enters a State and consents to be sued there. Foreign
corporations were deemed to have impliedly consented to jurisdiction by
registering to do business there.
(b) Presence: ∆ is physically located within the State when served.
(c) Citizenship: States always have jurisdiction over their citizens.
(2) In Rem Jurisdiction: jurisdiction over property/land physically located within
the State
(3) Quasi-in-Rem Jurisdiction: ∆’s property could be attached at outset of
proceeding so that an otherwise in personam case could proceed in rem
(b) States and their courts often sought to expand jurisdiction, like through quasi-inrem jurisdiction from Pennoyer. [Show Less]