Class Notes

POLI 244 FINAL STUDY GUIDE: 4 READINGS (LECTURE NOTES) McGill

POLI 244 FINAL STUDY GUIDE 4 READINGS LECTURE - LECTURE (10/11/17) • Today we are going to talk about polarity and the stability of international... [Show More] systems, this is sort of a continuation of the balance of power that we talked about last week. And we are going to consider an alternative theory to the balance of power, so a competitor to the balance of power theory, also another realist theory, which is called the theory of hegemonic war, Gilpin's theory of systemic change, sometimes it is referred to that as well. • So, let's start with revisiting polarity in the international system. We know that polarity refers to how the material power of states, meaning by this the military capabilities of states, is distributed in the international system, so that is going to give you the number of great powers that we have in the system and also it is going to say something about the symmetry or asymmetry that exists amongst those great powers in terms of material military capabilities. For example, in 1914, right before the start of the First World War, these were the great powers in Europe, it was a multipolar system, with 5 different poles of power, not all the great powers had the same military capabilities. Germany was, of the 5, the most powerful one at the time, followed by Britain, Russia, France and there were some lesser great powers, and what we see also here in this illustration, is that those great powers, in a way followed the predictions of balance of power theory, tended to form two alliances, so that each alliance would check the power or the other alliance. The idea here was to strike a balance and prevent war between the two blocs, which of course did not happen here, because war did occur, as we are going to study later on. Now the picture was very different, the polarity was very different to what the end of the Cold War, or pretty much at any point during the Cold War. This was a bipolar international system, with the two superpowers leading each of the two blocs. And within those two blocs, the asymmetries between the superpower and the other allies was huge, that's why this was not really a multipolar system, with many great powers, it was basically a system with two, so called great powers, which are called superpowers because there are just two, and again following balance of power theory, what we see is that, the world tended form alliances into two blocs, and the idea here was again, that each bloc would keep each other in check. In this case, it did work, because war between the two blocs did not occur during the 40-50 years of the Cold War. Now, let's look at the picture of the year 2000, so after the Cold War. This is a unipolar system, where we no longer have two superpowers, only one superpower is left, the Soviet Union imploded, and the United States was left as the sole superpower in the system. This is something that realists, well actually nobody in IR had much to say about, it took everybody a little bit as a surprise, because we were not used to having a unipolar system, usually the system, especially IR scholars focusing on contemporary international relations, they saw that international systems succeeded each other, and polarity varied, but it always varied within those two possible forms of polarity, either multipolar systems of bipolar systems. So we haven't really theorized much, up til then we haven't theorized much, about how unipolar systems would work. And in particular, what are the implications of unipolarity for the likelihood of war. Does unipolarity make an international system more stable or more unstable? 1 • This question had been asked, and answered, in relation to multipolarity versus bipolarity. Is a multipolar system more stable or more unstable than a bipolar system? So let's start with that question that we have answered and we are going to leave the question about unipolarity, and its impact on stability, for later on, very much towards the end of the course, this is pretty much where we are heading with everything that we are going to study. In a sense we are going to try to explain at the end of the course, what should we expect about stability or instability in a unipolar system. So let's start by this comparison between multipolar and bipolar systems. Following Kenneth Waltz, the founder of neorealism, there was a consensus in the discipline, that bipolar systems are more stable than multipolar systems. The short version being that bipolar systems are less uncertain, or generate less uncertainty in the system, than multipolar systems, multipolar systems are full of uncertainty and that makes the whole system more unstable, the likelihood of war greater. So why is that the case? Why would bipolarity be less uncertain that multipolarity. One of the reasons has to do with the flexibility of alignment, in terms of the different alliances that might form in these two kinds of systems. In multipolar systems, alliance are joined by different states for different reasons. The blocs in bipolar systems are formed based on one, common, shared interest, which is that one threat constituted by the other superpower in the system, its ideology, etc. So that makes bipolar blocks more coherent and more clearly defined. Switching sides, in this sense, is less likely under bipolarity. This has implications in terms of the 2 credibility of the commitments that a country within a bloc make to each other. Given that switching sides is not very likely, one can predict, with a certain amount of certainty, that your allies are going to act as real allies, and they are not going to betray you, when they are needed, in the case of war, and the like. This is not necessarily the case in multipolar systems, where the different allies can switch sides, because the interests relevant to you, might actually be outweighed by some other interest that might push them away from you. So inter-alliance commitments are more credible in bipolar systems. Also the commitments are more coherent, in the sense that they are less contradictory, precisely because there is one interest, one common, usually one common threat, that brings states together into an alliance, and that means that, that is the one main goal that determines the behaviour of the actors in that alliance. It is not that they have different interests, pointing in different directions, sometimes pointing in contradictory directions, that might make the behaviour erratic. In a bipolar system, behaviour tends to be less erratic, because there is one goal that tends to dominate all other goals, when it comes to alliance partners. In this sense, the bloc, under bipolarity, behaves more as a unitary actor, than in the case of multipolar systems. Another important difference between the alliance in a bipolar system and in a multipolar system, has to do with the distribution of power within the alliance, so the asymmetries or symmetries that might exist within the alliance. We know that in a multipolar system, there are many asymmetries within an alliance, but usually, there is a lot of military interdependence amongst the alliance partners. What do we mean by that? It means that if one of those allies, is defeated or defects on the alliance, this would reshape the balance of power in the system, you need to keep that ally in order to maintain the equilibrium, in order to maintain the balance in the system, if you lose that, say in the First World War, Germany loses Austria-Hungary, the whole balance of the system is lost, because Austria-Hungary has enough power capabilities to affect the balance of power, if it switched sides. This is not true in the case of bipolar alliances. Those alliances are basically maintained, or the balance in the system is basically maintained, by the two superpowers. So the other states, the lesser states, might switch sides and that would not necessarily affect the balance of power in the system, so the interdependence of military interdependence in bipolar alliances is very low, the superpower doesn't really need the lesser powers to protect the alliance, or the defend itself, or to maintain the balance of power, or to restore it, in the case that the balance is disrupted somehow. One indication of this greater military interdependence within in alliances, in the case of multipolar systems, is that one self-interested move by one partner, might drag the entire bloc into action, even if this didn't make much sense for the rest of the bloc. So the fate of that one partner, will affect everyone in the bloc. So take for example, Austria-Hungary. When Austria-Hungary went to war, Germany had to follow, or else Germany would lose Austria-Hungary as an ally, and this would alter the balance of power in detriment, of Germany. Likewise, if Russia marched, France had to follow, and so the same logic unfolds here. Conversely, the situation is very different, in say the Cold War, a bipolar system. Here we have that France and Britain, for example, could go to war in Egypt over the Suez Canal, and the U.S. could stay out of it. Why could the U.S. stay out of it? Well, because the fate of France and Britain, in that war, in Egypt, would not affect the balance of power, it would not be more of an advantage to the Soviet Union over the United States. So the United States would say, you want to go to war, go for it, I don't care because there isn't much at stake for me, I have enough power to defend myself. Germany could not say that to Austria-Hungary. France could not say that to Russia, in the context of the First World War. So each ally within the alliance, really depends on what the other allies do, and they might interact into conflict that don't really make a lot of sense, conflicts that are motivated for that one ally's self-interest or maybe some historical rivalries, or the like, but something that the alliance as a whole would have never gotten involved into. The issue of military interdependence being high within alliances under multipolarity, also implies that responsibilities are diffused, so it is not clear who has to do what, whenever for example, one of the allies is under attack, should we all go to the rescue, well obviously so, but if we don't want to all contribute, is there one of us that really has to step forward and take responsibility to defend the alliance. This is very clear in a bipolar world. It is clear that when the Western bloc was affected by something, the United States had to be there. And if the Eastern bloc was affected by something, the Soviet Union has to step forward and mark its presence. In the case of multipolarity, there is a 3 lot of incentive to pass the buck. Yes, we have to do something, because our alliance is being affected by some attack or something, but who is going to pay for it, who is going to send the troops, who is going to invest the money and the time? You do it, not me do it, you do it, you have enough capabilities to do it, well you do to, and you do to, and it's not very clear who is going to really take responsibility for it, so the collective action problems in these kinds of alliances is greater than under bipolarity. So the alliance might fail to react as it should react, in order to maintain the balance of power, and this might also generate then a greater likelihood of war. Finally, the issue of balancing. In the case of bipolarity, balancing for the most point takes the form of internal balancing, that is how the blocs balance against each other, by increasing their power capabilities, be that conventional weapons or that nuclear weapons, the idea is that these two blocs, especially the two superpowers leading the blocs, they are going to be engaged in some form of a arms race, because that is how they are going to keep each other in check, that is how they are going to maintain the balance of power. In the case of multipolarity, of course, internal balancing is important, especially because you can never trust your allies, but also it is very important to make alliances, it is very important to resort to external balancing. Why would external balancing, imply more uncertainty and more instability, than internal balancing? Because a sovereign state can control its military, its policies of rearming themselves, but you can never really control how you alliance is going to act, you can never control how your allies are going to behave, so there is an inherent instability and uncertainty, whenever you move from internal balancing to external balancing, basically you just move control of what this might result in. To sum up, multipolarity is associated with more uncertainty. Under multipolarity, the bloc behaves less as a unitary coherent bloc, and more as an unpredictable compromise between partners with different interests, and this is why uncertainty here is implied. Under multipolarity, dangers are diffused, responsibilities and reactions are unclear, and vital interests are defined differently by different members of the same bloc. Now this points to uncertainty, polarity implies more or less uncertainty, the less link is from uncertainty to war, from uncertainty to the likelihood of war. The implicit premise here is that more uncertainty makes more war more likely, less uncertainty makes war less likely, and this has to do again, with balance of power theory. More certainty means that the balance is going to be effectively maintain, and that is going to deter war, more uncertainty means that, many of these states are going to make mistake all the time, and this might result in disruptions in the balance of power, that one state might take advantage of and start a war. Now this is questionable, this link, this automatic link between uncertainty and the likelihood of war, because it is true that uncertainty can imply misperception, using bad information to make rational calculations and rational choices, for example the choice to go to war or not. Now this misperception might imply that you underestimate the costs of going to war, and therefore you engage in wars that you think are going to be relatively costless, or at least affordable, that they will become short, quick, and end with a very routine victory. Most of the states that got engaged in the First World War, for instance, thought that they were getting engaged in a very short war, where victory was short, and it turned out to be something completely the opposite. So what he is trying to say here is that misperceptions, bad information, might imply an underestimation of the costs of war, it could also imply an overestimation of the costs of war. So misperceptions might actually make war less likely, if it generated paralysis, because you think that any little war out there, might become a huge war, and therefore just to be safe, I would rather try to solve this conflict peacefully, rather than resort to war, I would rather not take advantage, I would be risk-averse as prospect theorists would say, so again, this link between uncertainty and the likelihood of war, is something that needs to thought through, and we are going to revise this particular point later on. Bipolarity Multipolarity Credibility of commitments High Low Contradictory commitments Less likely More likely 4 • Now he wants to say something about an alternative view of the stability in international systems, to that offered by balance of power theorists. This has to do with Robert Gilpin, another realist, but a bit more, as you are going to see, a bit more sophisticated than Kenneth Waltz, not because Kenneth Waltz is stupid, but because his theory is very much focused on one big factor, which as to do with the distribution of power capabilities, and here we are going to see that even though Gilpin is also realist, he is going to take into account, at least two important factors that are going to explain how systems change, or they are going to explain systemic change. For purpose of the story that Gilpin offers us, that even if the international system is in anarchy, it doesn't mean that it is chaotic, there is an order in this, and that order implies a system of government. Governments exist in anarchical political systems, just as it exists in domestic systems. All political systems, including international anarchic ones, have mechanisms of control, but regulate behavior in the system. Governments or control over international systems, is according to Gilpin, a function of three factors. The distribution of power, so nothing new here, the hierarchy of prestige in the system, and a set of rights and rules that set parameters of behavior, so these rights and rules basically determine the international order. We are going to focus on the first two, because they are the two relevant theories of systemic change that Gilpin offers us, focuses on the distribution of material power and the hierarchy of prestige. We learned what the distribution of power is, it constitutes the principle form of control for every international system. For Gilpin's though, again, he is very much a realist, there is no question in that, but he introduces this idea of the hierarchy of the distribution of prestige. Prestige in this theory, is the functional equivalent to the rule of authority in domestic politics. Authority or prestige, refers to the probability that a command will be obeyed. When the United States, say we have to go to war against Afghanistan after 9/11, is this command going to be obeyed or not, is it going to act, or in political terms of leadership, are people going to follow his lead or not, he is going to say something and people are just going to look the other way. Both power and prestige, function to ensure that the lesser states in the system will obey the commands of the dominant states, or the dominant state, in the case of one single state. Lesser states follow the leadership of more powerful states in part because they accept the legitimacy of the international order, the rules of the game, they find the rules of the game relatively fair, it might be convenient give in their interests. So in part, it has to do with the legitimacy of the international order, in part because of the utility of that order. In this sense, dominant states supply party rules, that lesser states take advantage of, party rules in terms of international security, in terms of economic stability, flow of economic exchanges and financial exchanges, and the like. These give other states an interest in following the lead of the dominant state, which is the one, that in a way, maintains the international order that we all take advantage of. Dominant states also promotes ideology, that justifies their domination over other states. So, it is not just about convenience, it is not just about your objective interests being satisfied by a particular International order, there is also an ideology behind it, there is also an ideology that helps you perceive that order as legitimate, including the relation of domination that exists in that order, because you know that you are not the dominant state in the system, you know that you are subordinate state, and yet you find that relationship of subordination legitimate, and something that you are willing to support as opposed to something you are willing to resist. Ultimately however, the hierarchy of prestige rests Intra-alliance military interdependence Low High Incentive to “pass the buck” Low High Flexibility of alignment Low High Balancing strategy Internal External Less uncertainty More uncertainty Bipolarity Multipolarity 5 on military power. Prestige is, in this theory, Gilpin's theory, the reputation for power, the refers to the perceptions of other states about a state's power and its willingness to use it. Prestige is very important because of your strength is recognized, you can generally achieve your aims without having to use that strength, you can simply make threats, that everyone is going to believe and they are just going to react as you would expect them to react. So you won't really have to make use of your power, as long as everyone believes that you have that power, and this belief, is what prestige is about. You are prestigious in the system, if everybody else thinks that you are very powerful and that you are willing to use that power, that power, ti discipline anyone who deviates from the international order. So the times of relative peace and stability, according to this theory, and this is the big difference with balance of power theory, the times of relative peace and stability have been most be most historical, during which the prestige hierarchy, has been clearly understood by states, and has remained unchallenged. Conversely, the weakening of the hierarchy of prestige, and increased ambiguity in interpreting that hierarchy of prestige, is frequently led to major conflicts and struggle. So in last resort, prestige means reputation for strength in war, and doubts about it, can only be set at rest by war itself. So how do I make others believe that I am very powerful and that I am willing to use that power. I have to demonstrate it, at some point I need to use that power, to convince everyone else that I have it and that I am willing to use it. So a country will fight when its prestige in diplomacy is not equivalent to its real strength. So, when in negotiation with the other states, the other states fail to recognize how powerful this state is, whenever this dominant states finds this, that he is no longer being respected as he should, given the power that he has, then he is going to resort to the actual use of power, to call everyone's attention to the fact that he is the one who dominates the system. and his views must be taken into account seriously. • So how are the distribution of military capabilities and the distribution of power and the hierarchy of prestige related? According to the theory, the hierarchy of prestige adjusts to reflect the distribution of power, but this adjustment is not automatic. So you have a distribution of power, say with one state at the top, and you have an equivalent hierarchy of prestige, that reflects that distribution of power. Over time there might be a disjuncture between the distribution of power and the hierarchy of prestige. The most powerful state, no longer is seen as the more prestigious one, the one with the most power is recognized. Why could this be this case? Not so much that the hierarchy of prestige changes, but rather because what changes is the distribution of power and the hierarchy of prestige doesn't adjust accordingly. So, what we see is, that a rising power might merge, say China grows more and more powerful over time, but in diplomatic circles, we still consider the United States as the dominant state, we take these views as the most important views to be considered, and we take China's views just as any other states views, even though China has become much more important. So here there has been a disjuncture between the distribution of power and the hierarchy of prestige. Why? Because the distribution of power has changed, China has become more powerful than before, but the hierarchy of prestige hasn't changed, it hasn't adjusted to these changes in the distribution of power. So what is that going to result in? Well, China is going to dislike that, and China is going to say that, well it is time for me to show everyone, how much power I have acquired, and it's time for me to show, therefore, the need to adjust their beliefs about how the distribution of prestige is now in the international system. So one of the principal functions of hegemonic war, is precisely this, it is to determine the international hierarchy of prestige, and thereby determine which states will in effect govern the international system. In this sense, hegemonic wars, are wars to restore the equilibrium in the international system. What do we mean by equilibrium here? A perfect reflection, or a perfection relationship between the distribution of power and the hierarchy of prestige, if there is a disjuncture of the two, the system is in disequilibrium, we need to adjust the hierarchy of prestige to fit with the objective material realities of power, and that is what the system, and how the system, is brought back into equilibrium. And the way this is done, is by hegemonic wars. So let's see what the model looks like. Gilpin's model will illustrate a system in equilibrium. What does it mean when an international system is in equilibrium, it is in equilibrium when the more powerful states in the system, or the most powerful states, are satisfied with the existing territorial, political, economic arrangements, so the international order. No powerful states, or state, believes that the benefits of a change in the system will erase 6 the anticipated costs of bringing about such a change. As long as this holds, the system is in equilibrium, nobody wants to change the system. In this sense, the international system is in equilibrium, when it articulates a legitimate international order. Again, legitimacy here implies the acceptance of the rules of the international order, by all the major powers, some minor powers might resist, but the importance here is that the major powers are all satisfied with the current international order. Now a legitimate international order doesn't make conflicts impossible, but it limits their scope. Wars may occur, but they will be fought in the name of the existing order, and the peace that follows will be justified as a better expression of the legitimate existing framework. Typically, satisfaction with the current international order comes in degrees, with some states being more satisfied and other states maybe less satisfied. • Despite this, in general, the theory distinguishes between status quo in a revisionist states. So status-quo states are those states that are going to support the current international system, that obviously includes the dominant state in the system, most of the great powers if the system is in equilibrium, and then what happens with the little and smaller states becomes less relevant. The revisionist states are those states that are dissatisfied with the current international order, and they want to bring about a change in the system, they want to alter the rules of that system, so that system better reflects their interests. So in terms of today's world, satisfied states would be of course the United States, but also Germany, Japan, Canada and Mexico, dissatisfied states would be Russia, Iran, North Korea, China is not very clear whether is is really dissatisfied with the system or not, it has become more and more of a participant in the international institutions created by the United States, which would the mechanisms of the international organ in question, it has become a member of the WTO in the 1990s, for instance, it has profited from the system, especially in economic terms a lot, China has grown like no other country, like no other great power in the system, in the last 20 years, in that sense, China has profited from this system much more than the United States in the last 20 years. So it is not clear whether China wants to really revise the system and change the rules, or not. When it comes to certain rules, say those rules related to international economic relations, when it comes to for instance, the status of human rights, so in general the more normative structure of the international system, China yes, has been quite a dissident, and tended to deviate quite strongly from the dominant view that human rights are more important, year after year, and can actually limit a state's capacity to exercise its sovereignty rights. So it really depends on what part of the system, what part of the international order you look at, China might be more dissatisfied, or it less dissatisfied. Now, is revisionism independent of shifts in the distribution of power. The answer is no, it is not independent from changes in the distribution of power. A state's expectations depend on its position in the international system. A position of power comes with an increase in expectations, if I am more powerful than I used to be, I expect that everyone else is going to take my interests more into account, than before, and I expect the rules of the game to be a better reflection of my interests, then it used to be in the past. I could conform in the past, because I was weak, now that I am stronger, I want the system to be a better reflection of my interests. So, rising powers tend to become less and less satisfied, more and more 7 revisionist, as they acquire more power. What about the other way around, that the more of a revisionist you are, the more likely it is that you were going to acquire more power. That relationship could also exist. The reason being that because you are dissatisfied with the current international order, you have an additional incentive to amass power, because your role is to prefer to change that order that you were dissatisfied with. If you are satisfied with the order, you won't try to put together enough weapons to fight against it, but if you are dissatisfied, then you have an incentive to become more powerful, and you might actually succeed, and in that sense, there could also be a possible relationship between the two here. So in this sense, an international system in equilibrium is not static, is not at rest, it is in a dynamic equilibrium, in which constant readjustments take place in order to preserve the defining characteristics of the systems. In fact that the relative stability of the system, and this is actually very important, the relative stability of the system is largely determined by the system capacity to adjust to the demands of the actors involved in that system. When a powerful actor becomes dissatisfied with the existing order and demands a systemic change, a demand that the system cannot process and adjust to, then the system is no longer in equilibrium. So the more flexible the order is, and the more able it is to satisfy the demands of the different subordinate states, the more stable it is going to be, the more likely it is that it is going to remain in equilibrium. If it is not able to give a proper response to dissatisfied states' demands, then that might push the system into disequilibrium at some point. • What are the main factors, according to this theory, that stabilize the international system? There is one major factor, and that is the uneven growth in power. The uneven growth in power means that the dominant state, State B in this graph, cannot grow as fast as a rising power. So take t1 in this graph. The dominant state is more powerful than the challenger, but the challenger is rising faster than the dominant state. At some point, if that trend continues, we are going to see that the challenger is going to become dominant in the future, and the dominant state is not going to be able to maintain its dominance in the distribution of power. And that at some point is going to be reflected in the hierarchy of prestige, if not automatically, then through hegemonic war. This implies that there is a big risk of preventive wars, why? Because when the dominant state sees that there is a revisionist state out there, that is becoming more and more powerful, and the dominant state itself, cannot keep up with that growth, so basically when the dominant state sees this graph and anticipates what is going to happen in the future, it is not going to just sit and wait until the challenger becomes more powerful and it can do nothing about it, it is going to act now, preventively, trying to prevent State A, in this case, from becoming the dominant state in the system. So when you see that the distribution of power is going to change in the future, you can take your present advantage over that rising power, act today, fight a war, and prevent that change in the distribution of power from happening in the future. In that way, you can maintain you hegemony. What are the factors that explain why it might be the case that a dominant state cannot grow as 8 fast as a challenger? Many of these factors are not endogenous this theory, meaning that the theory cannot explain these factors. For example technological innovations, finding more efficient ways of political organization, the emergence of a good leader as opposed to a bad ruling elite in a country, all these factors can contribute as to why one state is better at growing than the dominant state, or another state for that state, for that matter. But there are some factors that are endogenous to the theory, so the theory itself can explain why it is most likely that the dominant state is going to be less capable of growing as fast as a challenger out there, and this has to do with uneven environmental pressures, the pressures felt by the dominant state and the pressures felt by the challenger are very different, why? Because of the security concerns. Security concerns are less pressing for the dominant state than for others, especially for those dissatisfied with the system. Others then have more incentives to be over achievers in this sense. Moreover the reason a state grows faster than the dominant one, and that dominance becomes less of a reflection of the actual distribution of power in the system. So the hierarchy of prestige is more fake, it becomes more fake, than a real reflection of the distribution of power. To the rising power, replacing the existing hegemony, with its own hegemony, becomes more attractive, the expected benefits of doing so, tend to outweigh the expected costs, especially because it is now becoming more powerful. The system then is no longer in equilibrium. A system is in disequilibrium when there develops a disjunction between the existing international system and the potential gains to particular states from a change in that system, this in terms of again the hierarchy or prestige and the distribution of power. As a consequence of this disjuncture, the governments of the system begins to break down, as perceptions catch up with the realities of power. The once dominant state is increasing its ability to impose his will on others, and to protect its interests. The rising state increasingly denies changes in the system, that will reflect their newly gained power and their unmet interests. Finally, the stalemate and the issue who will run the system, and under which rules, are resolved through armed conflict, and this is what hegemonic wars look like. Before that, what happens in the system is a bipolarization of the system. At some point, war starts to look inevitable to everybody in the system, and the other states, some satisfied, some dissatisfied with the current order, begin to choose sides. The international system then becomes divided into two great blocs, and the war between the declining hegemon and the rising challenger tends to involve many other states as well. The dis-settlement that follows the hegemonic struggle, hegemonic war and the disagreement create a new status quo and a new equilibrium in the system, that reflects the new distribution of power that follows from this hegemonic war. Now why is the war going to happen? Who launched the war? It can be either the challenger, so the challenger initiates hegemonic war to bring its status in the system into line with its rising military power, or the declining leader might initiate a preventive war to block the rising challenger, while the opportunity is still available. What does the hegemonic war result in? Who is going to win? We don't know. It could be the hegemon that is able to crash the challenger, and so restore the system back to the old equilibrium or the new challenger might now become the new hegemon, altering the rules of the game, or it could be a third state, it could be that the old hegemon and the challenger will weaken each other in this hegemonic war and that third state, steps forward and takes the lead and becomes the new hegemon. So the outcome of that hegemonic war will be unpredictable, but what we know is that the system, in this cyclical theory, the system is going to be restored into some equilibrium, which eventually, again is going to be lost. 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